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“Municipal Welfare” and the Neoliberal Prison Town: 
The Political Economy of Prison Closures in New York State 
 
 
Abstract 
Since 2010, New York State Governor Andrew Cuomo has closed nine state prisons for adults.  
For the prison towns that dot diversely rural and urban places of New York —each uniquely tied 
to the maintenance of mass incarceration— the closure of a state prison marks the end of an 
infusion of state capital constructed and construed quite explicitly as projects of economic 
development in the 1980's.  After decades of growing corrections budgets and expanding prisons 
across the United States, why is New York closing prisons now?  Tracing the history of prison 
growth and urban governance in prison towns, I posit that the closure of prisons indicates a shift, 
but not a shrinkage of the carceral state, marking new modes of punishment and strengthening 
others in an age of increasing austerity.   
 
 
Reaching the most emotional pitch of New York’s State of the State address in January of 
2011, Governor Andrew Cuomo said, “An incarceration program is not an employment 
program. If people need jobs, let’s get people jobs.  Don’t put other people in prison to give 
some people jobs. Don’t put other people in juvenile justice facilities to give some people jobs. 
That’s not what this state is all about and that has to end this session” (Cuomo, 2011).  For 
legislators and their friends in the Chamber of Commerce in the northernmost counties of upstate 
New York, known as “the North Country”—these words “rang an alarm bell” (Brown 2011). A 
rural economy kept afloat by the construction and maintenance of state prisons since the 1980’s, 
a representative of the Saranac Lake Area Chamber of Commerce stated that with the threat of 
prison closures, “Our economic well-being is at stake at this point” (Brown, 2011).  For the 
prison towns that dot diversely rural and urban places in New York State—each uniquely tied to 
the maintenance of mass incarceration— the closure of a state prison marks the end of an 
          Morrell Page 2 of 15 
 
infusion of state capital constructed and construed quite explicitly as a project of economic 
development.  After decades of growing corrections budgets and expanding prisons across the 
United States, why is New York closing prisons now?  In this paper, I posit that in order to 
understand prison closures in New York, we must first understand the conditions in which the 
prisons opened in the first place. Using ethnographic from Elmira, New York, and current data 
from the North Country of New York State, I look at the historical trajectory of prison 
construction and maintenance in New York State since the 1970’s.  I look at the prison as a state 
project of urban governance and economic development with a particular focus on the social, 
political and economic problems prisons were imagined to solve.  After briefly describing the 
recent prison closures, I analyze what these closures might tell us about the state of the carceral 
state in New York: what aspects of this project are shrinking, shifting or changing?  Tracing the 
history of prison growth and urban governance in prison towns, I posit that the closure of prisons 
indicates a shift, but not a shrinkage of the carceral state.  I show how the state maintains an 
incredible arsenal of maximum security prisons, including the growing use of Special Housing 
Units, or all solitary confinement prisons, and new forms of surveillance while fulfilling the 
axiom of austerity by closing some prisons. 
   
There are now more than 2 million people incarcerated in the United States.  This rate of 
state supervision, unprecedented in American history, reflects a massive growth over the past 
four decades of the role of the U.S. state in social control (Gottshaulk 2006: 1).  These numbers 
are expanded when we include men and women under the supervision of a parole officer or those 
subject to the stop and frisk policies of local police departments or the increasing criminalization 
of public services, like requiring drug tests for public assistance. The racialization of the 
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American criminal justice system cannot be underestimated: half of those incarcerated in U.S. 
prisons are African American, while African Americans make up only 13% of the population 
(Gottshaulk 2007: 3, see also Alexander 2010, Mauer 2006).  Mirroring-- and perhaps 
catalyzing-- a national pattern of prison growth, the number of people incarcerated in New York 
State more than tripled between 1980 and 2000 from 21,929 to 70,112 men and women (The 
Correctional Association, 2003).  Importantly, there has been a sizeable drop in the numbers of 
people incarcerated in New York State in the last decade roughly 56,000 incarcerated men and 
women in 2011 (Pfeiffer, 2011).  As a result of this drop, nine state prisons for adults have been 
closed in New York State: two under the direction of the Patterson administration, and seven 
during the current Cuomo administration (Virtanen, 2012). 
Theorizations of neoliberalism point to a growing carceral state in relationship to the 
making smaller of the welfare state or redistributive functions of the state (Wacquant 2010, 
Harvey 2007); I posit that the closure of prisons in New York State marks a shift in, but not a 
weakening of, the punitive elements of the neoliberal state.  Indeed, the incarceration rate in the 
United States has declined for the first time since 1972 (Pew 2009), and yet new forms of 
surveillance and control are emerging in place of the old.  Most significantly, the prisons closed 
in New York State have all been medium security or minimum security prisons. Sixty prisons 
remain in New York State, fifteen of which are maximum security or “supermax” all solitary 
confinement prisons.  During the same process of reducing the number of people incarcerated in 
New York’s prison, there has been a significant growth in the use of solitary confinement in New 
York State and across the country (see Rhodes 2003), including the construction of two facilities 
whose entire incarcerated population (fifteen hundred men, in addition to five hundred “cadre” 
inmates who do work in the facility) is in solitary confinement— Southport Correctional Facility 
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in Elmira, New York, and Upstate Correctional Facility in Malone, New York.  The growth of 
solitary confinement is coupled with what Gottschalk refers to as a heightened criminalization of 
the “worst of the worst” (2007), individuals incarcerated on felony charges who are remaining 
incarcerated for longer terms.  Lancaster (2011) points to a growing panic about the criminality 
of sex offenders—including mechanisms of surveillance ushered in by Megan’s Law requiring a 
publically available, lifetime registration searchable by geography.  In addition, there has been an 
expanded use of civil confinement and electronic surveillance such as ankle bracelets.  So while 
the reform of the Rockefeller Drug Laws, New York’s notoriously harsh sentencing for 
nonviolent drug offenses, has led to the release of some men and women, there is a shift in the 
modes of surveillance and control.  Many “low-level offenders,” are serving their sentences in 
the rapidly expanding system of county jails, thus reducing the number of state prison inmates 
but nevertheless maintaining state surveillance (Kaplan, 2007).  Taken together, the heightened 
criminalization of those who are deemed violent offenders through the use of solitary 
confinement, new modes of surveillance, and tougher sentencing, and the devolution of lower 
level offenders to county prisons and parole do not indicate a shrinking carceral state, but rather 
a shift in the modes of punishment.   
  This set of changes has its political and economic roots in the right-wing project of 
economic austerity.  Under the auspices of downsizing, or in the Governor’s terms, “Rightsizing” 
New York State’s prisons, New York State is fulfilling the axiom of government austerity set 
forth during the 1970’s and 80’s.  In the wake of a growing recession and state fiscal crisis, the 
prison closures also mark the limits of prison expansion as a project of economic development, 
or more clearly, a mechanism for state capital infusion into poor, mostly rural places across the 
country.  Throughout the 1980’s, New York State prisons were put forth quite explicitly as 
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projects for economic development by the state economic development programs, ironically, 
under the direction of Governor Andrew Cuomo’s father, Governor Mario Cuomo.  In Elmira, 
New York, a place the New York Times asserted that,“[p]erhaps no other small city in the 
Northeast provides a more vivid example of how American manufacturing has declined,” prisons 
were presented by state and local urban governance as a solution to the loss of manufacturing 
work (Lueck, 1985) and in other parts of the state from the restructuring of farming and mining 
industries (Huling, 2002) The closure of prisons suggests that this project has run its course.
1
 
Prisons as Economic Development:  New York State in the 1980’s 
When I first started my research in Elmira, New York, a small city of roughly 30,000 
people in central New York State, in 2006, I went into the Steele Memorial Library, the main 
public library in downtown Elmira, and looked in the card catalogue under “prisons”. The 
catalogue included an index of many articles about the two state prisons in Chemung County but 
the first card also said – see also economic development.  A small city of just under 30,000 
people in central New York State, Elmira was seen as a good candidate for one of the twenty-
nine new prisons proposed to be built in New York State under the leadership of Governor Mario 
Cuomo (Schlosser 1998: 57). The city was already home to the Elmira Correctional Facility, 
                                                          
1
 By focusing on the political economy of prison closures, I do not mean to underestimate the impact of  
social movements for the rights of the incarcerated in hastening changes in sentencing reform.    As 
Lancaster suggests, despite the growth of other forms of punishment, “the long tide of punitive 
lawmaking also shows signs of abatement” (2011: 228) regarding drug crimes.  In thinking through the 
catalysts of a shrinking state prison system as both a political and economic shift, we cannot 
underestimate the influence of the largely urban movement working to eliminate the Rockefeller Drug 
Laws (a campaign called Drop the Rock) and seeking larger changes in criminal justice policy.  It is 
through these efforts that in many instances the War on Drugs itself became seen as a problem rather than 
a solution to the problem of crime.  Years of organizing work by formerly incarcerated men and women 
and advocates for penal reform set the foundation for Cuomo’s political dialogue and for the project of 
decarceration.  It remains the responsibility of scholars and social movements to focus on the areas and 
mechanisms of growth in the carceral state.   
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built in 1876, and was reeling from the loss of thousands of manufacturing jobs. Some city 
leaders and residents were eager for the relatively high-paying jobs in the proposed prison. 
“Great! Call Elmira a prison town, call it anything you want,” an editorial in the local paper, the 
Elmira Star-Gazette encouraged, and keep up that, “spirit of cooperation,” in order to secure a 
“fat new payroll” for the area (Elmira Star-Gazette 1986: 4A.).  When the Southport Correctional 
Facility opened in 1988, the increased numbers of state jobs available for Elmirans at the prison 
fueled high hopes for a brighter economic picture for the area.  Both despite and because of state 
prisons providing the mainstay of the regional economy, the Elmira area remains impoverished.  
In the history of the prisons in the United States, New York’s methodologies and changes figure 
heavily in national patterns of incarceration; from the penal experiments with reform (and 
torture) in the 19
th
 century in prisons at Auburn and the Elmira Reformatory to the Rockefeller 
Drug Laws of 1973, New York State has provided a national model for incarceration that many 
states chose to follow.  Thus, we must take note of the current changes in New York State’s 
repertoire of methodologies in social control:  as goes New York, so goes the country. 
Following Harvey’s (1989) notion that the final three decades of the twenty first century 
marked a shift in the organization and function of cities, whereas the formerly managerial mode 
of urban governance was replaced by a necessarily more entrepreneurial function in an 
increasingly competitive, globalized world, I look at how dominant actors in Elmira’s political 
economy become intertwined with the political economic project of prison construction in 
Albany.  At the height of the prison construction boom, the New York State Urban Development 
Corporation, the UDC, was a primary vehicle for capital investment in the state.  The UDC made 
a mark in late 1970’s as vehicle for what Smith (1996) has called a revanchist reclamation of 
space for the uses of middle class and bourgeois interests, such as the transformation of Times 
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Square and Bryant Park in New York City. The broadly defined uses of the UDC waxed and 
waned through the tumultuous fiscal era of the 1970’s and into the early 1980’s.   In the early 
1980’s, a new director, Vincent Tese outlined a new agenda for the governance of New York 
State‘s economy—laying the future squarely in the hands of private businesses following 
Reagan’s plan for tax abatements and relaxed labor regulations as a solution to the national fiscal 
crisis.  Announcing a new direction for New York State, Tese said, “It is axiomatic that the 
private sector is the engine which drives New York‘s economy” (Tese, 1985). At the same time, 
Tese created an incongruity to this axiom:  the most significant shift in the use of the Urban 
Development Corporation during the early 1980’s was the use of the public authority to build 
new prisons across New York State.  In the spring of 1981, the Security through the 
Development of Correctional Facilities Bond Act of 1981 (hereafter “the Bond Act”) was 
introduced in the New York State Senate. The Bond Act proposed to sell bonds for construction 
of three new prisons to house 1500 additional inmates at upstate prisons Wallkill, Woodburne 
and Coxsackie, as well as lesser amounts of money for state troopers and the expansion of 
facilities for juveniles. When he Bond Act was narrowly voted down on Election Day, November 
1981, Tese used the Urban Development Corporation to fund prison expansion.
2
 The use of the 
UDC as a vehicle for prison construction was an oblique way of growing the prison system after 
the electorate voted down the ballot measure allowing the purchase of bonds for prison 
construction. 
                                                          
2
 The Bond Act’s defeat was indeed indicative of the electorate’s concerns about crime across the state; 
somewhat surprisingly, it was upstate voters who tipped the scales against the initiative. In the midst of a 
crime wave and panic, voters in New York City cast their ballots 2 to 1 in favor of the measure, suburban 
voters evenly, but in upstate New York (defined as all of the counties north of Westchester County) the 
measure was defeated 3 to 2. Koch made a veiled suggestion that it was the racism of upstate voters who 
didn’t want the prisoners in their towns, saying, “the measure was defeated by upstate voters who feared 
the construction of new prisons populated largely by people from New York City.  Nevertheless, the 
growth in New York State prisons was predicated on prison construction being viewed as a jobs program 
by upstate politicians and local growth machines.   
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The twin projects of neoliberal urban governance-- prisons as both economic 
development and mechanisms of overt social control and public abatements and incentives for 
private companies, emerged as solutions to the disinvestment by the federal government and the 
experience of job loss for working-class New Yorkers. These solutions were offered by the UDC 
as solutions across geographies and demographics of New York State.  For example, in the first 
round of demarcating the land for Enterprise Zones in 1987, Ogdensburg, in the Northernmost 
part of New York State was chosen as a pilot site (New York Times, 1987).  Nearly thirty years 
later, the North Country is home to more than a dozen new state prisons.  In Elmira, New York 
the same pattern prevailed:  Elmira’s politicians applied to be considered for the new state 
enterprise zones.  Shortly after the application was made, the city became a preferred site for a 
new prison.   
While they seem to be opposite sides of the coin—one the expansion of prisons, a “public 
work” and the other, the classic neoliberal trope of self-sufficiency in giveaways to 
corporations— these urban/rural development plans dovetailed in Elmira in the notion of 
rejecting “municipal welfare”.  In a public hearing in Chemung County on the formation of 
Enterprise Zones in New York State (Smith, 1986), local public officials, business people, and 
advocates for the unemployed described a desperate situation in the city of Elmira and the 
surrounding areas: the highest unemployment rate in the state, the loss of thousands of 
manufacturing jobs, and the shrinking tax base. Facing the loss of the federal development 
grants, local politicians and their growth coalition partners were all equally desperate for 
assistance from the state. Following the neoliberal rhetoric of the era, the mayor of Elmira 
explicitly stated in a public hearing that the city was not looking for “municipal welfare,” but 
rather an opportunity to thrive, insistent on the fact that “we have done everything we can to help 
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ourselves” (Smith, 1986, p. 54).  That is, local development officials followed the state line: feed 
the axiom of privatization while growing punitive state projects. (As head of the UDC, Tese was 
highly involved in all of these projects, from prison siting to more tradition UDC activities like 
finding tenant businesses for the massive abandoned A & P plant in Elmira.)  For many 
Elmirans, however, prisons were not and are not seen as a giveaway to upstate; rather, in contrast 
to welfare and public assistance, they were viewed as an opportunity for workers to “help 
themselves”3. In Governor Andrew Cuomo’s 2011 State of the State Address, he rejects this 
previously agreed upon formula for upstate development: prisons are again considered municipal 
welfare and Cuomo wants upstate off the dole.   
Solitary Confinement in the Age of Austerity 
Throughout the prison construction boom, prisons—their construction, their maintenance, 
their purpose—remained political battlefields4.  A riot at the Southport Correctional Facility, and 
the state inquiry into the situation two years later, provides some insight into the effort by 
                                                          
3 Like welfare, Americans can’t or don’t see the prison as an experience of dispossession, but rather view 
it as a product of the inmates’ pathological dependency on the state. In my fieldwork with Correction 
Officers and their families, I found that their discursive treatment of inmates and their families echoes a 
belief that poor people, and poor people of color above all, are disproportionately the recipients of 
entitlements from the government. This is manifest in prison workers’ ideas that inmates are always 
trying to get something for free: health care, cigarettes, food, etc., and that their families are moving into 
Elmira’s public housing and getting welfare. Fraser and Gordon trace the historical trajectory of notions 
of dependency in relationships of subordination, which legitimized inequalities of enslaved people and 
women’s subordination to men by characterizing their “dependence” as a character flaw. A sign of 
personal weakness, the supposed dependency (ultimately embodied in the fictive omnipresence of black 
teen mothers on welfare) was juxtaposed with white working men’s “independence” through access to 
waged labor (Fraser and Gordon 1994). In the postindustrial landscape, I argue that incarcerated men and 
women and their families have been semantically included in what Fraser and Gordon call the expanding 
“moral/psychological register” of the racialized notion of welfare dependency when “all dependency is 
suspect and independence is enjoined upon everyone” (1994: 324). Within this historical framework, 
many workers see their own dependency on the state (as their employer) as aproblematic and to some 
extent an entitlement of their citizenship and their work. 
4
 As early as the 1960’s, formerly incarcerated criminologist John Irwin argues that there was a conflict 
between “treatment” oriented staff and custodial or security staff that eschewed helping the inmates for 
more punitive terms of incarceration.  In Irwin’s analysis, the custodial staff emerged victorious making 
way for a more conservative organization of our country’s prisons.  (Irwin, 1980) 
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conservatives to curtail the expenditures of the prison boom while maintaining the massive 
expansion of prisons.  When the Southport Correctional Facility was built in 1988, it was built as 
a maximum-security facility.  In January of 1991, as part of a new state experiment in 
corrections, the prison began a conversion to what the state calls a “punitive segregation” 
facility, meaning that every man is held in a solitary cell called a Special Housing Unit.  While 
there are a section of solitary cells designed for disciplinary confinement in many New York 
State maximum security prisons (referred to as the “SHU”, “The Box,” or “The Hole.”) it was a 
penal experiment to design a prison specifically to house 600 inmates all in cells by themselves 
23 hours a day, with an hour a day of recreation in a metal “exercise pen”.  Born in the wreckage 
of the Attica Rebellion
5, this “no frills” prison finally took seed when proposed by the 1983 New 
York State Assembly Republican Task Force on Correctional Crisis (of which the Elmira 
representative, George Winner, was the chairperson) as a budget cutting strategy for the 
gargantuan and growing corrections budget.  According to this taskforce, holding all of the 
inmates deemed “troublesome” at a single location with severely restricted services meant that 
fewer workers were required to staff “excess” programs. By May 1991, there were 650 men 
living in solitary confinement at Southport and an additional 150 cadre inmates (men in general 
population) that serve as cooks, cleaners, etc. Because Southport was originally built as a 
                                                          
5
 Sparked by a protest of one inmate’s treatment, the rebellion at Attica quickly became rallying point for 
social movements for racial and economic justice and a turning point in the history of U.S. prisons.  In the 
aftermath of the Rebellion, many administrators made a call for a new style of incarceration to deal with a 
new menace.  Speaking at the memorial for guards slain at Attica, and only for the guards, the chaplain at 
the Elmira Correctional Facility made a statewide plea for the creation of a separate “maximum security 
institution for about 150 hardcore, militant, Marxist revolutionaries” (Philips, 1971).  He predicted more 
rebellions similar to what happened at Attica if these individuals weren’t isolated.   Stories in a series 
printed in newspapers across the state, tell of wardens hindered by lack of money to do their jobs, inmates 
from broken families, and, a “new breed of militant inmate” (See Elmira Star Gazette September 13-15, 
1971).    
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maximum-security prison the metal cages designed for recreation were built on top of basketball 
courts.  The speedy and haphazard conversion from maximum security to an all SHU facility was 
at the heart of the events that unraveled, in that it was apparently easily overtaken by men 
exercising there.
6
 
 The union of correction officers, AFSCME Local 82, and their allies in city and county 
government in Elmira took issue with the experiment, largely because a prison with fewer 
programs and fewer staff went back on the promises of the prison construction boom: jobs, jobs, 
jobs.  For the administrators in the prison, an all Special Housing Unit prison was created with 
deficit reduction in mind; considering that the majority of DOCS budget is workers’ salaries, 
despite already minimal services to incarcerated people, labor costs for services were a likely 
candidate for budget cuts.  In his testimony, the state Commissioner of Corrections, Coughlin, 
blamed a “small number of officers” for wanting the “experiment” at Southport to fail 
(Commission, State Correction, 1991, p. 7).  The warden at Southport suggested that there was a 
problem of absenteeism and low-morale as workers had “never bought into the SHU facility 
concept,” particularly in regards to the lay-offs it belied (Commission, State Correction, 1991, p. 
15).  Importantly, the first lay-offs in State Corrections in twenty years (since shortly before the 
Attica Rebellion) occurred shortly before the uprising.  According to civilian workers and 
advocates for the incarcerated, the blatant cuts in services—chaplains, teachers, psychologists—
created a more volatile environment in the prison. George Winner, the area’s representative to 
the State Assembly,  the 1980 Assembly Republican Special Investigative Committee on NYS 
Prisons and the Chairman of the 1983 Assembly Republican Task Force on Correctional Crisis, 
was put in an awkward position:  he made it known that he still supported the “concept” of a  
                                                          
6
 Gathered from ethnographic interviews. 
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“maxi-maxi” secure facility for the purposes of punitive segregation, but his “frequent 
communication with staff at ECF and SCF” demonstrated that there were problems with the 
project  (Commission, State Correction, 1991, p. 42).  His commitments to the program of 
austerity put forth by his committee were at odds with the need for jobs among his constituents.  
County-level Republican politicians were clearer about their constituents’ interest in the project 
of incarceration:  Tom Tranter, the County Executive, told the local paper:  “the community feels 
a strong sense of betrayal because of the conversion of the facility” (Simpson, 1991).  Despite 
these resentments, the super-maximum security prison is still in Elmira, with no resistance to its 
program or goals from what I saw during my research.  In fact, the prison is off the beaten path 
in Elmira and receives relatively fewer visitors when compared with the Elmira Correctional 
Facility; it is thus a less visible part of the daily life of the city.  The closures of prisons, and 
announcements of intentions to close more, in other parts of the state, however, catch the 
attention of Elmira.  Certainly, what was formerly seen as an industry impermeable to 
recessionary fluctuations is now not considered as stable an industry.   
 
Despite Cuomo’s exhortation that we “get people jobs,” his administration’s proposed 
program for economic recovery in cities and towns where prisons have closed is unlikely to do 
so. Rather than public money for job creation in the public sphere, Andrew Cuomo, similarly to 
his father, is beholden to the notion that private business creates jobs and grows the economy. In 
light of the political battles in prison towns, he Governor and the Empire State Development 
Program created a new program specifically for prison towns where a prison is closing, called 
the Economic Transition Program.  In exchange for the closure of prisons and the job loss by the 
county’s workers, Cuomo offered an economic development package valuing $50 million. The 
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program is guided by, and in many ways, replicates the program of economic development active 
in the state since the 1980’s: tax credits and grants for businesses creating jobs. Based on the site 
of the prison, rather than a city or a village, the capital offered for Economic Transition Areas 
would be available for new businesses creating at least five new jobs within a short distance of 
the closed prisons, and only up to ten percent of what a private company invested (Development, 
2011). Any new businesses in the area within a ten mile radius of Camp Georgetown in the 
village of Georgetown in Madison County in rural New York State would be eligible for the 
credits, if they were willing to commit millions of dollars to the project. Local development 
advocates doubt that this would bring any new business, considering that similar programs have 
been in place for years and have attracted little interest. 
What is clear from Cuomo’s new plan is a sharpening his approach to the role of the state 
times of fiscal crisis. During the massive shifts in manufacturing employment in the 1980’s, 
prisons were a critical part of the attempt to “fix” the political economy of New York State; in 
this current crisis of 2011, closing prisons emerges as a key part of further dismantling the state. 
In order to foment a politics that eschews the use of prisons as a project of economic 
development but values the redistributive role of the state, it is necessary to theorize the human 
links created between prisons and towns that trouble the project of containment and create more 
humane projects of economic development for cities big and small. 
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